National Communications System Briefing TemplateNational Communications System Briefing Template
Hurricane Isabel:
Government-Industry Partnership in
Planning, Response and recovery
CAPT J. Katharine Burton, USNCAPT J. Katharine Burton, USNAssistant Deputy Manager, NCSAssistant Deputy Manager, NCS
[emailprotected]@ncs.gov(703) 607-6103(703) 607-6103
NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: Hurricane IsabeHurricane Isabel
Advance hurricane path information assisted both Government and Industry preparation actions: Review preparation checklists Confirm emergency operations staffing availability Confirm Industry and Government contact information Establish reporting procedures (changed during event due to FEMA and
DHS HSOC schedules) Industry prepositioned assets (e.g., teams, generators, alternate fuel
supplies) and re-routed traffic around impacted areas Response coordination followed NCC Telecom-ISAC model for
Government-industry cooperative effort NCC Telecom-ISAC industry reps provided status updates / requests to
NCC Operations Center NCS Emergency Operations Team and Watch at NCC coordinated
Government and industry requests for info and assistance NCS EOT staffed ESF02 desk at DHS/FEMA; deployed personnel to
Region III & IV Ops Centers, DFOs in North Carolina and Virginia
Examples of NCC CoordinationExamples of NCC Coordination
Request from industry for Government assistance: Coordinate permission to temporarily house industry disaster recovery
technicians on local military bases if hotels in Virginia disaster areas were not available.
Request was granted, but need did not occurr
Government request for industry assistance: Communications support to disaster area: Deployment of a satellite van to Richmond, VA area to provide emergency
telecommunication service. The processed approximately 425 calls from an estimated 175 users and remained operational until 6 pm Sept 23
Stand-by of a self-contained communications trailer in Knoxville, TN
Telecom hotel in Baltimore experienced a commercial power failure during the evening of Sept 22, and had issues with refueling the generators. ESF #2 contacted ESF #12 (Energy) to highlight the issue with Baltimore
Gas and Electric (BGE) and facilitate restoration by 3 AM
NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: NCC Telecom-ISAC Role: Hurricane IsabelHurricane Isabel
Some telecom-specific issues: Personnel restricted from access to sites on backup or battery
power Lack of coordination between individual power companies’
restoration plans and notification to Telecom providers hampered efficient deployment of technicians
Telecom lacked a priority input to Power restoration, which is handled at the local level
Reporting issues: The Government has taken lessons learned and is developing
processes to: Best Coordinate Timing of Reporting For Various Organizations Consolidate Information Required
Enhanced processes will provide maximum operational and response results for Government and Industry.
Isabel Infrastructure ImpactsIsabel Infrastructure Impacts
Telecom industry was well prepared before landfall; infrastructure showed little disruption or damage Telecom emergency teams performed damage assessments and emergency
restoration; continued to deploy backup generators and emergency personnel Recovery efforts continued for the days following landfall. One provider
indicated that 75% of reported damage was repaired by Friday, Sept 19 Downed trees and equipment failures due to flooding also caused damage Reports included 235 downed utility poles and 258 downed cables
Most problems due to loss of electric power Reports of up to 76% of customers in VA, 50% in D.C. and MD losing power Overall, telecom faired well, with most providers switching to backup power
generation to keep facilities operational. Backup power was adequate for sustaining services for most of the heavily impacted regions
By Sept 22, the number of impacted customers quickly declining. One provider reported that 12K customers had been without service, but that number had been reduced to less than 4K by Sept 23
To aid restoration efforts, providers deployed generators and technicians from other regions to impacted areas of Virginia
Isabel Infrastructure Impacts (2Isabel Infrastructure Impacts (2)
Despite adequate preparation and prompt recovery efforts, some customers were without telecom service for an extended period North Carolina’s Outer Banks had severe infrastructure
damage and major telecom outages; power out for nearly two weeks in some areas, causing telecom backup power systems to fail.
Due to prolonged power outages, spotty wireless coverage and intermittent landline telephone service occurred in such areas.
Sample Wireless Provider Impact Sample Wireless Provider Impact ReportReports
Wireless
Provider A
19 SeptSites on alt power include DE 1, MD 17, VA 42, NC 18, PA 16, NJ 5No network problems or controls in effect
22 Sept Sites out of service include NC 0, PA 1 (0.1%), Balt/Wash 38 (6.4%), NY 0, New Eng 0
Wireless
Provider B
19 SeptSites on alt power include 1 switch, 4 POPs, 173 cell sites (4%)Down 762 cell sites (19%)
2 OctPOP on generator145 sites on alt power170 sites down (14%)
Wireless
Provider C
146 cell sites out (20-25%) largely VA
Wireless
Provider D
Focus on DC/Balt region for generator deployment
Alt power = battery or generator
Wireline
Provider A
19 Sept759 Remote tandems on alt power66 poles downRepair log x4 normal
20 Sept Central offices on alt power
119 VA, 34 MD, 34 DE & PA
Wireline
Provider B
21 SeptSites on alt power MD 7, VA 17, NJ 1, DE 1, NC 5, PA 2600K+ calls blocked
2 OctPOP on generator145 sites on alt power170 sites down (14%)No network controls or issues
Wireline
Provider C
19 SeptSites on alt power 98
2 OctSites on alt power 45 Focus is VA and MD
Wireline
Provider D
18 Sept19 Central Offices on alt power66 digital loop carriers (DLCs) on battery with 8 failed
20 SeptCentral Offices on alt power = 0DLC sites on alt power = 0
Sample Wireline Provider Impact Sample Wireline Provider Impact ReportsReports
